The unconstrained production and dissemination of knowledge in the form of alternative interpretations, analyses, commentaries, reports, theories and concepts is considered to be an essential characteristic of liberal democracies. Yet, all knowledge is policed in a variety of subtle ways ranging from self-censor, the "gatekeeping" role of journal editors/reviewers, ideological leanings of journals/newspapers, spons orship of research and the career aspirations of scholars. This paper examines the threat of (libel) lawsuits to discipline or inhibit scholarly accounting research. Evidence is provided from three case studies in which the authors sought to disseminate a lternative research and analysis. It addresses the processes of negotiating the dissemination of our research with legal professionals and coming to terms with an increasing awareness of how legal processes can be invoked to silence or curtail our interventions.
INTRODUCTION
The production and dissemination of knowledge in the form of alternative interpretations, analysis, commentaries, reports, concepts and theories is considered to be a major characteristic of liberal democracies
1 . Yet, an established body of literature shows how governments, professional bodies, and major organisations are actively engaged in policing knowledge (for example see, Crossen, 1994; Chomsky 1989; Herman and Chomsky, 1994; Said, 1994; Thompson, 1963; Thompson, 1990) . Knowledge and power are intertwined, each being a medium and outcome of the other. Instead of striving to cleanse knowledge of power, it is more coherent to foster an awareness of how forms of power, including legal processes, constrain as well as enable the dissemination of knowledge.
There is also an emergent literature exploring the policing and politics of the production and dissemination of accounting knowledge (for example see, Zeff, 1982; Briloff, 1981; Puxty and Tinker, 1995; Sikka et al, 1995) . Studies of how accounting knowledge is policed complement the growing appreciation that accounting as a political technology affects the distribution of income, wealth, savings, investment, jobs and power (Baker, 1995; Sikka, 1992) . As accounting knowledge is problematised, accounting scholars have been urged to intervene more directly in worldly affairs (Moore, 1991; Hammond and Sikka, 1996; Carnegie and Napier, 1996) and report 'inconvenient facts' to a wider public (Willmott et al, 1993; Sikka and Willmott, 1997) . Whatever means are favoured for challenging established accounts of accounting, they are necessarily negotiated and policed through a variety of politically charged processes. These include inter alia the "gatekeeping" role of journal reviewers and editors (Tinker and Puxty, 1995; Lee, 1997) , the ideological leanings of scholarly journals (Chwastiak, 1996; Z eff, 1996) , pressures of research assessment exercises (Puxty et al, 1994) , career aspirations of academics (Parker et al, 1998) , pressure upon the employers of critical scholars (Jack, 1993) , sponsorship of research (Fogarty and Ruhl, 1996) ; and pressures by accountancy firms and professional bodies to prevent publication of challenging books and papers (Zeff, 1982) . To this catalogue may be added the threat or direct use of the law to inhibit or discipline scholarly research and possibilities of interventions in public affairs (Briloff, 1981, Ch. 12; Sikka et al, 1995) .
This paper contributes to the literature by providing further illustrations of the role of law in the policing of knowledge. We explore three episodes arising out of our efforts to subject aspects of the accountancy establishment in the UK to critical examination. In particular, we focus upon how law as a resource (in the shape of threats of libel lawsuits) can be used to suppress forms of knowledge or discredit the carefully cultivated 'official' image of accountancy as a 'profession' that is above reproach. In principle, libel laws are developed to protect all citizens form false and defamatory statements that are damaging to their reputations. In practice, however, libel laws are invoked by those with access to the financial resources required to threaten and, if necessary, pursue libel actions. As we shall
show when considering our first episode, the possibility of legal action is often sufficient to inhibit, abridge, or self-censor the production of unflattering forms of knowledge.
This paper is organised into three main parts. The first part argues that a powerful elite is able to police knowledge by producing intimidatory 'flak' to discredit alternative voices.
One of its tactics is to use law and threats of lawsuits to police the dissemination (and production) of knowledge. The second part provides details of the three episodes in which we have sought to disseminate alternative research and analysis. We provide background and context of how the prospect of threat of legal action arose and how it operated to inhibit, revise or embolden our activities. In each of the episodes, we found ourselves either negotiating the dissemination of our research, analysis and commentary (and thus the revision of its production) with lawyers or acting with increasing awareness of how legal processes might be invoked to silence or curtail our interventions. Our first episode relates to attempts to get a paper published in Accounting, Organizations and Society, in which we examined the involvement of accountants in money laundering activities . This paper became the subject of four separate legal opinions, each opinion advising progressive dilution of arguments and even excision of some sections. The second episode relates to our intervention in the affairs of Jersey 2 (part of the Channel Islands), a UK Crown Dependency. In 1996, the Jersey government enabled PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young to privately finance and draft a very favourable Bill on Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs) with a promise that it would be quickly enacted. Subsequently, we sought to create wider international awareness about the politics of Jersey through a paper for Political Quarterly (an international political journal).
The editor, aware of the reputation of the Jersey government and its advisers for creating intimidatory 'flak' to silence alternative analysis, persuaded the publisher to obtain a legal opinion on our paper. The third episode relates to our attempts to democratise 3 the second largest UK-based accountancy body, the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 4 (ACCA), described by The Times as an organisation that "has always tended to be more secretive than it should be" (The Times, 16 May 1996, page 30) . As reformers disseminated their views through Accountancy Age
5
, ACCA threatened legal action against Accountancy Age and reformers for allegedly making defamatory comments 6 . In the final part, we reflect upon the three episodes and their implications for undertaking research into the accountancy profession which challenges the public face of respectability. We conclude that those with financial resources readily appeal to legal professionals who have a strong commercial interest in identifying a string of difficulties or the likelihood of legal action; and then use such legal advice to secure compliance with this opinion. An alternative would be for those academics and their employers who are potentially or actually intimidated or harassed by such use of the law to join together to fund legal specialists with a commitment to identifying ways of minimising the inhibitory effects of libel laws upon the capacity of academics to release their research findings into the public realm.
POLICING KNOWLEDGE: SOME ISSUES
In liberal democracies, most knowledge is not directly policed by state sponsored institutions. Nonetheless, the production and dissemination of knowledge is organized in a variety of subtle ways that shape the subjectivity of the writers/authors and make them acutely aware of the terms and boundaries of the debates (Chomsky, 1989; Herman and Chomsky, 1994) . Notably, the organizational, institutional and political resources of a variety of 'ideological state apparatuses', including law (Althusser, 1971) , shape people's worldviews and encourage the belief that the contemporary social arrangements are 'right and proper' and that the alternatives to status -quo are not real (Lukes, 1977) . Those engaging in "the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth" (Foucault, 1984, p. 74) and refusing to reproduce the status-quo risk being harassed and policed by what Herman and Chomsky (1994) call, "flak" which "takes the form of letters, telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits ...... and other modes of complaint, threats, and punitive action" (page 26).
'Flak' may be a product of (righteous) indignation, primarily as a response to someone perceived to have the audacity to question or subvert authority. One of its aims is to question the integrity of critics and reformers, and with it discredit alternative analysis, reports and worldviews. The ability to produce 'flak', and especially flak that is costly and threatening is related to power. In a society marked by numerous inequalities, a power elite frames which issues are 'key' issues, and marginalizes issues that are threatening. In this respect, a favourite tactic is to portray dissenting voices and competing discourses as 'negative' and 'alien' (Chomsky, 1989; Herman and C homsky, 1994) . Often these portrayals seek to manufacture 'folk-devils' and create 'moral panics' by labelling the opponents as 'communists', 'Marxists' and 'troublemakers' who are a threat to a way of life or tradition (Cohen, 1972) and somehow deserve to be demonized and/or silenced.
Those supporting the status quo are rarely inclined or required to offer 'hard' evidence in support of their `truths', such as those that the accountancy profession is democratic; auditors are independent; accountants help to fight fraud. Yet a much 'higher' degree of evidence is demanded from critics. Such evidence is always considered to be deficient and its alleged weaknesses are used to undermine claims advanced by reformers. Yet, 'flak' is not always effective or successful. A paradox of consequences is always possible. 'Flak', which strays beyond the acceptable limits, may attract negative attention and discredit its producers. It may also stiffen the challengers' resolve to advance competing discourses.
In liberal societies, people are encouraged to believe that laws are devised to protect and defend the right of free speech and expression. A popular view is that the role of intellectuals is to give voice to what is suppressed, ignored, forgotten and marginalised by being 'oppositional' figures (Said, 1994) . However, increasingly the law (in the shape of actual/possible libel and defamation lawsuits) is used as a tool for policing knowledge and silencing alternative voices (Herman and Chomsky, 1994) . As puts it, "The threat of a libel suit is now a reality for everyone, including scientists who choose to speak out publicly-or even write letters to the editor-on controversial issues" (p. 15). When displeased, a power elite has the capacity to issue lawsuits to silence unwelcome inquiries and comments (Cohen, 1999) . This threat of lawsuits is the outcome of a calculation intended to scare and silence competing voices (Davies, 1995; Bower, 1996) by subjecting them to "substantial material and psychic burdens" (Briloff, 1981, p. 219) .
Lawsuits, of course, do not have to be pursued. The mere threat can be sufficient to exert a powerful self-disciplining force persuading editors, journalists, scholars and commentators to engage in self-censorship. In a society where power elites make regular use of the threats of lawsuits, considerable ambiguities and uncertainties are created. Challengers become uncertain of when they risk straying beyond imprecise boundaries, and thereby invite unwelcome attention and possibly a costly lawsuit. The threat of lawsuits has a potential to damage careers, life and financial security. As a consequence, some may voluntarily censure themselves and not stray beyond the limits defined by others. Through threats of lawsuits, those powerful enough can generate a feeling that certain discourses are delinquent, or at least that the credibility of those advancing competing discourses is in doubt and ought to be double-checked. Appeals to lawsuits certainly impose additional costs upon the dissemination of alternative views. As a consequence of the legal threats, it is likely that fewer individuals are willing to advance alternative interpretations, analysis and commentaries although, as we have already noted, such measures can have unintended consequences when they act to fuel rather than suppress opposition.
Some may be able to absorb or even be energised by the hostility and pressures generated by the threat of lawsuits and other forms of 'flak' by developing strategies for coping.
Others may be unwilling to bear the high personal costs and take refuge in 'conformity', 'silence' and reluctantly or willingly walk the path to privilege and prestige that organised interests can bestow upon them. Overall, 'flak' makes the task of confronting power costly and difficult to pursue awkward questions and disseminate dissident discourses.
POLICING KNOWLEDGE: THREE EPISODES
In this section, we provide some background about the three episodes that required us either to negotiate our work with lawyers and/or be aware that lawyers may become involved. Each of the episodes refers to research or to a course of action that was not sponsored by a research grant from any accountancy firm or accountancy body or indeed from any grant awarding body. We were under no compulsion to undertake the research or to become involved in any of the episodes. Rather our involvement stemmed from the commitment to scrutinise power relations and raise uncomfortable questions about the status -quo.
POLICING KNOWLEDGE 1: RESEARCHING MONEY LAUNDERING
The background to this episode is that during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, we and non-accountants (e.g. Ian Griffin 8 , Roger Humphrey and others). Accordingly, the judgement had implications for agencies concerned with the regulation of accountants as well as non-accountants. Allegations made during the high profile court case could and, in our view, should have triggered an investigation of the involvement of the larger accountancy firms in the AGIP affair. The court judgement did not make any explicit comments on the conduct of audits, but it raised questions about the vigilance of auditors as the monies were diverted through the use of forged bank drafts.
The absence of any regulatory response to the court judgement prompted us to engage in a dialogue with the regulators. We sought to discover how the regulatory apparatus was responding to the revelations of the AGIP case. This inquiry was pursued through a series of questions raised in Parliament (e.g. Hansard, 30 January 1991, col. 523; 19 November 1991, col. 116; 27 June 1994, col. 479; 29 June 1994, col. 610) Mansell, 1991a Mansell, , 1991b Mansell, , 1991c Mansell, , 1991d Mansell, , 1991e, 1995 . In return, he shared much of his evidence with us.
The AGIP affair became more highly charged politically when a French lawyer, a middleman and central to the allegations of money laundering, claimed that a former UK One common method of parrying our requests was to refer us to the findings of an unpublished ICAEW report, even though the report could not deal with the involvement of non-accountants. In any case, the ICAEW has no general authority to examine files of accountants and has no powers to secure evidence from non-UK sources. Despite the unequivocality of the High Court judgement, the ICAEW report concluded "there is insufficient evidence available to the Institute to justify the bringing of a disciplinary case against any of its members". In a letter that sought to defend its inaction, the ICAEW also argued that for any disciplinary action, "the test to be applied is not that used in civil proceedings but rather the standards used in criminal cases. A formal complaint cannot properly be preferred unless there is adequate evidence supporting the contention that the members concerned knew or ought to have known that the activity with which they were associated was illegal or that they were recklessly indifferent as to whether or not the activity was wrong. No compelling evidence to satisfy the test required has been obtained".
(Letter from the ICAEW to Austin Mitchell, dated 9th May 1994) . The ICAEW report and the supporting evidence were not available for public examination.
We wanted to write a paper based upon the above for a number of reasons. Firstly, a paper on the possible involvement of accountants in money laundering had a potential to expand the range of accounting research. Secondly, the paper had a potential to problematise government policies that assume accountants/auditors to be key actors in any battle against organised financial crime. Prime facie, the evidence at our disposal suggested that the leading accountancy body, the ICAEW was unwilling or unable to mount any sustained investigation into such alleged involvement even when it supported by a High
Court judgement. Thirdly, through questions in Parliament and considerable correspondence with Ministers and regulators, we had secured some access to uncharted 'regulatory spaces' and indeed had encountered a proficiency at passing the buck but a deficiency when it came to taking investigative action. We wanted to share our evidence with a wider audience, and thereby to foster further consideration of the regulation of accountants and the state-profession relationship.
The 1996 Critical Perspectives on Accounting (CPA) Conference was i dentified as an appropriate venue for presenting our findings. Mindful of how others had been served with lawsuits to silence their unwelcome disclosures (Davies, 1995; Bowers, 1996; Cohen, 1999) , we were concerned about the possible legal implications of airing our paper.
Following a discussion with the Registrar of one of the author's Universities, it was agreed that it would be prudent to submit the draft paper, together with some of the supporting evidence (extracts from Police files, invoices, sworn statements, etc.), to a London-based law firm for an opinion. For a fee of £1,500, a six-page legal opinion was received (in early February 1996) 13 . One of the issues identified by the lawyer related to the 'publicness' of our evidence. In the UK, which does not have 'freedom of information' laws, the lawyer advised that only matters and information which had already been read out in the courts or presented at quasi-courts (e.g. profession's disciplinary hearings) could reasonably be construed as 'public' evidence. Any evidence that could be identified as 'private' information could be highly problematic. We were advised to exclude any reference to 'primary' evidence from our paper since some of the parties might argue that the material was 'confidential' and t hat its circulation could possibly leave us open to a lawsuit. In addition, the lawyer went through the paper, line-by-line, and suggested how some of the 'riskier' words might be replaced with relatively safe ones 14 . Rather than using our own words to describe and supplement the AGIP court case, we were advised to stick as closely as possible to the actual words used by the High Court judge. The lawyer concluded by saying that "Whilst I consider that the adoption of the proposed amendments I have set out above will lessen the risk of complaint in defamation on this paper, such a risk cannot be entirely excluded."
In view of the lawyer's advice, the paper was extensively revised. The text of the revised paper closely followed the text of the High Court judgement. Rather than referring to any primary sources, the paper relied almost exclusively upon secondary sources, especially the reports already published in Accountancy Age. Some sections of the paper involving UK and non-UK parties were deleted. The revised paper together with further supporting evidence was resubmitted to the same lawyer together with a covering letter in which we answered each of the points and also identified the sources of our original information. In late February 1996, we received a further two-page legal opinion that stated "I am satisfied that the changes which have been adopted go a very significant way towards reducing the risk of defamation proceedings being brought on the paper. ........ Following the amendments to the manuscript ....... I consider this paper unlikely to attract successful defamation proceedings". The revised paper was presented at the CPA Conference in April 1996 and placed on the conference's internet site 15 . We also released a copy of the paper 16 to the press (for example see, Daily Telegraph, 22 April 1996, p. 23; Accountancy, May 1996, p. 15; Manchester Evening News, 23 April 1996; Spiked, April 1996, p. 11 and 17) .
In April 1996, the version of the paper that had been vetted and cleared by lawyers was submitted to the journal Accounting, Organizations and Society (hereafter AOS). With the benefit of hindsight, we should perhaps have indicated to the editor that the paper had already been subjected to two legal opinions and that a lawyer had cleared that version being submitted. Four months later, we contacted the editor to find out how the refereeing process was proceeding, and were told that he was "still awaiting reviews" (letter dated 4th September 1996) . Around December 1996, through telephone conversations, we became aware that legal opinion was being sought on the paper. In early February 1997, we received the reviewers' comments. One of the reviewers was happy to accept the paper in its present form whilst the second reviewer suggested some minor revis ions. To the editor's accompanying letter was appended seven pages of legal opinion (dated, 9th December 1996) . The editor added that "I can only offer to publish the paper in AOS if it can be given the legal all clear by the legal advisors of Elsevier (publisher of AOS) Science" (letter dated 7 February 1997).
The lawyer's opinion began by stating that "I am asked to advise as to the libel risks involved in publishing an article in the Accounting, Organizations and Society Journal relating to the involve ment of accountancy firms in money laundering". The lawyer then went on to explain that two possible defences of "qualified privilege" and "fair comment" were available against possible libel charges resulting from the publication of the paper. To maximise the potential of these defences, the lawyer advised us to delete some sections: in particular a footnote (containing references to news) relating to the increasing involvement of accountants in white-collar crime, a section relating to AGIP auditors Coopers & Lybrand, and a section recording the fact that the Chairman of the House of Commons Trade & Industry Select Committee had failed to respond to our concerns about the involvement of accountants' in money laundering. In addition, the lawyer also advised us to delete some names and also to (further) dilute some of the arguments.
At this point, we could have contemplated approaching another journal perhaps with an acknowledgement that the paper had been cleared by lawyers and accompanied by an offer to provide a copy of the legal opinion plus supporting documents. However, we anticipated that any editor/publisher would seek to obtain their own opinion if they detected any risk of a lawsuit. We also felt that we would be honour bound to explain the recent background to the paper and especially the legal opinion sought by Elsevier which (if it is not a libellous suggestion) might be interpreted as casting doubt upon the competence of the lawyer who provided the first opinion and cleared the version submitted to AOS. In the event, we decided to respond (and possibly capitulate) to the lawyer's opinion sought by Elsevier. In doing so, we were conscious that rejecting the paper would hardly be a problem for AOS or Elsevier, though we were also somewhat comforted by the knowledge that other editors were interested in the paper.
In making the revisions, the challenge was to do the absolute minimum to satisfy legal opinion. However, as we have already noted, this required that substantive changes were made to the paper 17 . As obtaining legal opinions is costly, we felt that the AOS publisher would probably not wish to become involved in any extensive and protracted negotiations.
The economics of legal opinions suggested that we would probably have only one chance of negotiating with the lawyer and that the form of this negotiation would require us to demonstrate how we had complied with the lawyer's advice.
Under the circumstances, we accepted virtually all the recommendations made by the Elsevier lawyer. The revised paper was resubmitted to AOS (on 30th May 1997) together
with a large bundle of papers consisting of our source documents and copies of the two previous legal opinions. These documents were forwarded to the Elsevier lawyer who, it was subsequently discovered, came from the same Chambers in London as the lawyer who had provided the first set of legal opinions. Upon discovery of possible 'conflicts of interests', the Elsevier lawyer now withdrew from the assignment. Through the efforts of the AOS editor, the Elsevier in -house legal department then took charge of our paper. It provided us with two further pages of legal opinion (letter dated 9 February 1998), requiring further changes to the paper which we agreed to make and the paper ) was published in August 1998.
In September 1998, we sought to make the findings of the research published in the AOS paper available to a wider public so that it might contribute to a public debate on issues raised by the article. An extended version of the paper in the form of a monograph that was written in a less academic style was published 18 under the title " The Accountants'
Laundromat" (Mitchell et al, 1998b In addition, " The Accountants' Laundromat" included reference to the unpublished ICAEW report (see above) which had exonerated the accountants involved in the AGIP affair. To us, the form and content of this report seemed wholly inadequate and inconsistent.
It comprised summaries of various news clippings rather than any primary evidence. It did not contain any details of questions asked, the information requested, replies secured, and/or the files/witnesses examined. It did not make any reference to evidence that we had supplied to the ICAEW (e.g. invoices relating to the formation and servicing of the shell companies, sworn affidavits by some of the parties, copies of the police files). In the interest of a wider public debate, this report was made publicly available (Accountancy Age, 17
September 1998, p. 12-13) through an internet site 23 and the ICAEW in-house magazine was informed of this act (Accountancy, November 1998, p. 18) . No correspondence of any kind has been received from any of the parties mentioned in the monograph.
The Accountants' Laundromat (Mitchell et al, 1998b) Affairs in the early 1990s) and to the ICAEW. Following cons iderable press publicity, Grant Thornton's in-house legal adviser also purchased (letter dated 22 September 1998) a copy of the monograph (Mitchell, 1998b ). Yet, despite this publicity and the inclusion of material that we had been advised to suppress or dilute by legal counsel, no writs have (so far) been issued.
POLICING KNOWLEDGE 2: JERSEY: A LEGISLATURE FOR HIRE
This section draws attention to the context of our interventions in Jersey (part of the Channel Islands), a UK Crown Dependency. We initially intervened in the context of the Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) legislation, but soon found ourselves involved in debates about financial regulation and the state of human rights. We supported reformers through articles, analysis, press comments, Early Day Motions (EDMs) and by generating pressures upon the UK government to intervene in Jersey politics. We also sought to create international awareness of Jersey's politics by writing an article for Political Quarterly (Mitchell and Sikka, 1999) . As the editor of journal was aware of the reputation of the Jersey government and its advisers for creating 'flak', he first sought a legal opinion on the paper.
Our interventions arose initially in the context of the Limited Liability Partnership (LLP)
debates. In early 1996, Jersey decided to enact a LLP Bill. This Bill was initially drafted by Price Waterhouse (now part of PricewaterhouseCoopers) and Ernst & Young at cost of one million pounds sterling. In this Bill (subsequently an Act), the major firms gave themselves considerable liability concessions by diluting the traditional principle of 'joint and several liability'. The Bill contained no public accountability requirements although the eventual Act required firms to file names and addresses of each partner with Jersey authorities. There was not even a requirement for the firms to state on their letterheads and invoices that they were registered in Jersey. In particular Article 9(2) stated that "Subject to the partnership agreement, it shall not be necessary for a limited liability partnership to appoint an auditor or have its accounts audited". The Act contained no provisions for investigating errant auditors and offered no rights to audit stakeholders. It contained little, if any, provisions relating to the insolvency of the LLPs (these aspects were introduced in May 1998). Mitchell, 1997a Mitchell, , 1997b Mitchell, , 1997c Sikka, 1996b Sikka, , 1996c Sikka, , 1996d Cousins et al, 1998; Financial Times, 26 September 1996, p. 7).
During the Parliamentary proceedings (September 1996) 8 November 1996; 15 January 1997; 12 February 1997; 18 February 1997) .
The UK government refused to intervene (letters dated 5 November 1996; 11 December 1996; 7 February 1997) We have continued to support reformers and have contributed to the debate through articles
and press comments (For example see, Mitchell, 1997a Mitchell, , 1997b Mitchell, , 1997c Sikka, 1996b Sikka, , 1996c Sikka, , 1996d With this in mind, we prepared a paper titled, "Jersey: Auditors' Liabilities versus
People's Rights" (Mitchell and Sikka, 1999 Quarterly] about this piece before publication" 37 . The firm confirmed that "we did indeed approach your office at Political Quarterly because we had picked up on the grapevine that you [the editor] might have received an article for publication" 38 . Possibly, taking this uninvited inquiry as a signal for further, less benign moves, the editor persuaded the publishers to obtain a legal opinion on the paper. Although no substantive comments were received from any reviewer of the article, on 14th October 1998 a four page legal opinion was received. On this occasion, we negotiated the requested changes by providing further evidence and by altering the style of our writing rather than by deleting any sections. The revised paper was published in 1999 (Mitchell and Sikka, 1999) . On 22nd February 1999, Shandwick, advisers to the Jersey government, wrote a letter of protest to the editor of Political Quarterly, alleging that the paper contained a mixture of "factual inaccuracy and muddled information". When invited to list the inaccuracies and muddled information, Shandwick's director declined 39 .
POLICING KNOWLEDGE 3: DEMOCRATISING THE UK ACCOUNTANCY PROFESSION -THE CASE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS (ACCA)
This section reports exchanges with the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) arising from our attempts to highlight the nature of its 'democratic' practices and to render these congruent with contemporary practices adopted by politicians, trade unions and other professional bodies. To appreciate the nature of these exchanges, it is necessary to sketch some elements of the ACCA's operation and procedures.
The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) is the second largest UK based accountancy body. The ACCA's royal charter (dated 25 November 1974) lists that one of its objects is "to promote and facilitate the dissemination and exchange of information on matters of professional interest among members and others ....." (clause 3f). In the mid1990s, it claimed to have 47,000 members (reaching 60,000 in 1998) and 120,000 registered students in more than 100 countries (Certified Accountant, September 1996, page 1). Following the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Companies Act 1989, the ACCA acts as a designated regulator for insolvency and external auditing. Its entire Council is directly elected by its members, but it does not owe a 'duty of care' to ACCA members or any member of the public affected by its policies. It is relevant to note that in contrast to the secrecy afforded to ballots for local, regional, national and trade union elections, the names and addresses of ACCA members are printed on ballot papers. Until 1994, the ballot papers for Council elections were required to be returned to the ACCA Chief Executive rather than to an independent scrutineer. Currently, and in ma rked contrast to the norms of political elections in liberal democracies, the ACCA ballot papers are not numbered and election candidates have no right to observe the count or demand any recount. ACCA officials retain the surplus stock of ballot papers. Furthermore, under its byelaws, the Association operates a system of 'delegated proxy voting', a system prohibited for the election of trade union officials. (Sikka, 1994 (Sikka, , 1995a (Sikka, , 1995 (Sikka, , 1995c (Sikka, , 1996 Mitchell, 1996 , Robins, 1997 Executive to the Vice-Chancellor of the University of East London). This letter was followed by a public statement stating that "if there was institutional endorsement of Mr.
Sikka's views, the association may have considered cancelling its long-standing accreditation of its courses at the university" (Financial Times, 9 December 1993, p. 14) . extraordinary general meeting, the ACCA leadership deployed the in -house magazine to dissuade members from supporting the call for an EGM. The magazine was also used to launch a series of personalised attacks upon Sikka. The ACCA President advised members that organisers of the EGM were using "incorrect information", "unsubstantiated allegations", "unprofessional language" (Langard, 1996) . The subsequent articles and letters selected for publication by the ACCA officials went on to argue that Sikka should "retract [his views] with some expression of regret, or to resign" and urged members to "question the genuineness of the man [Sikka] and validity of what he writes" (Certified Accountant, August 1996, p. 15-16) . Subsequent attacks questioned "why he [Sikka] chose to join it
[ACCA] in the first place" (Certified Accountant, September 1996, p. 15) . The leadership's campaign ran for three consecutive months (July, August and September 1996) and prompted Sikka to seek a 'right of reply'. To this end, letters were sent to the ACCA President (letters dated 19 July 1996 and 16 August 1996) and the editor of its in-house magazine (letter to the editor of Certified Accountant, 19 July 1996), but such a right was not granted 58 (letter from ACCA President, 24 July 1996). Sikka (and some of his supporters) sent letters to the magazine, but none of these were published. On 28 August 1996, Austin Mitchell (a member of the House of Commons) sent a letter, but it was not published either. However, in this case, the editor of Certified Accountant wrote "I note the points you make, which have been raised before and well-aired, but do not consider your letter appropriate for publication 59 " (letter dated 9th September 1996) .
Despite the campaign by the leadership, the necessary signatures for the EGM were secured but the motions put forward by reformers were all defeated (Certified Accountant, December 1996, p. 1, 3 and 11) . The attention of the press was inadvertently attracted by comments made by the ACCA Vice-President during the proceedings of the EGM on 31 st October 1996. Speaking from the official platform (and flanked by President, Deputy President and Chief Executive) and wearing his office regalia, the ACCA Vice-President Within the above context, an article by Austin Mitchell had been published in Accountancy
Age on 12 September 1996 (Mitchell, 1996 . It became the centre of a dispute and prompted the ACCA to threaten legal action. The Mitchell article attacked the ACCA for silencing reformers and for its poor public accountability. It also stated that "the ACCA gave its publishing contract to a firm in which the 1995/96 president had a commercial interest 65 . This wasn't made public during his term 66 " (Mitchell, 1996, p. 14) . The information in the article was based upon previous correspondence between Austin Mitchell and ACCA Chief Executive (letters from Austin Mitchell dated 26 September 1995 and 16
October 1995; letters from ACCA Chief Executive, dated 9 October 1995 and 19
October 1995). The correspondence was released to the press and generated a front-page news item in Accountancy Age 67 (Accountancy Age, 19 October 1995, page 1). The charge was repeated by Sikka (1996) , alongside which there appeared a commentary from the ACCA Chief Executive. In the commentary the ACCA Chief Executive 68 made no observations on the disclosures about the then former President's business interests.
For nearly a year after the Accountancy Age news item detailing the Mitchell-Rose correspondence (i.e. the item appearing on 19th October 1995), there was no correspondence from the ACCA, its former ACCA President, or anyone alleging that material contained in the articles was defamatory or incorrect. Soon after the publication of the Mitchell (1996) article, however, which appeared at a time when Sikka was being subjected to personalized attacks by ACCA officials in the run-up to the EGM (see above), the ACCA Chief Executive wrote to the editor of Accountancy Age. In this letter, she alleged that the Mitchell article contained defamatory information in relation to the business interests of the former President. The letter demanded a public apology and added, "I suggest that you need to take very great care indeed about future material which you publish over the names of Messrs Sikka and Mitchell and their various supporters 69 . Please let me have your undertakings that you will not again publish this or any similar allegations" (letter from ACCA Chief Executive to the editor of Accountancy Age, dated 20 September 1996) .
In response, the editor of Accountancy Age reminded the ACCA Chief Executive of the origins of the information (i.e. her correspondence with Austin Mitchell) and that no objections had been received to previous publication of that information (see above for details). The editor went on to add. "I must decline your request for undertakings not to publish 'this or similar allegations" (letter dated 1st October 1996). There was no further correspondence between Accountancy Age (backed by the economic resources of an international publisher) and ACCA. Nor was any correspondence received from the former ACCA President, his lawyer or ACCA lawyers. On 24th September 1996, however, twelve days after the Mitchell (1996) article, ACCA lawyers Messrs Morgan Bruce (a London-based law firm) wrote to Austin Mitchell. They alleged that that the information published in relation to the business connections of the former President was defamatory, and stated, "We act for the Chartered Association of Certified Accountants" ...... no doubt [you would] wish to withdraw this seriously defamatory allegation in an agreed statement to be published in Accountancy Age in a permanent position, and to undertake that you will not repeat this or any similar defamatory statement. ...... We await to hear from you or solicitors on your behalf forthwith and certainly within the next 7 days". A further letter (18 October 1996) demanded the above commitment "within the next three days". Despite further letters 70 no apology or undertaking of any kind was given by Mitchell and his article was not withdrawn. With the passing of the EGM, no further correspondence was received from ACCA or its lawyers.
This was not the only occasion on which the ACCA threatened legal action. In December 1997, Austin Mitchell (an elected representative of the people) sent a twenty page petition to the Sovereign 71 detailing his concerns about ACCA governance and democracy (Accountancy Age, 15 January 1998, p. 1). The ACCA response was to say that it is "taking legal advice on the contents of the document" and that the Member of Parliament "could face a libel lawsuit" (The Accountant, 4 February 1998, p. 6). Nothing further was heard, possibly because the ACCA officials were not at that time facing scrutiny through an extraordinary general meeting.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
When describing and commenting upon the episodes, we are necessarily presenting our particular perspective or `gloss' upon events. We have sought to provide as full and scrupulous account of events as we can within the space available. That said, it would be perverse of us to claim that our version and interpretation of events is unsele ctive or uncoloured by the experience of being involved in the events that we report. Our objective has not been to provide a definitive account of the episodes but, rather, to reflect upon them as a way of illuminating the role of the state, in the form of the law, in policing knowledge of elements of the UK accountancy establishment.
Each episode required us either to negotiate our publications within a legal framework, or with an awareness that defenders of the status quo would not hesitate to mobilise legal threats to intimidate, harass and discipline us. In each case, we could be seen as engaged in "ruffling some feathers or rousing some rabble" (Moore, 1991, p. 784) . In the moneylaundering case, our anxieties about the sensitivity of a paper that explored the connection of accountancy firms and moneylaundering initially led us to seek legal advice as a form of protection against possible libel actions that might be directed at ourselves or at our employers in a bid to suppress the contents of our paper. Although we had endeavoured to be exceptionally diligent in presenting evidence and in our choice of words, we recognised that we lacked an understanding of how our words could be represented in a court of law. It was our sense of exposure to the possibility of a libel action that led us to seek legal opinion. We assumed that subsequent requests for counsel's opinion from Elsevier were motivated by similar anxieties. In the second episode, an article submitted to
Political Quarterly discussed the role of Jersey's public relations consultants in wooing senior UK government officials. Mindful of the reputation of the Jersey government and its advisers for using threats of legal action to silence critics, the editor obtained a legal opinion on the paper. On t hat occasion, it proved possible to respond to the legal advice by providing further evidence and by altering the style of our writing rather than by deleting substantive content. In the final episode, a threat of legal proceedings was received following publication of an article in Accountancy Age that had made allegations about a former President of the ACCA. An agreed statement withdrawing the allegation was repeatedly sought, together with an undertaking not to repeat it or any similar defamatory statement. Despite the refusal to give any such undertaking, no legal proceedings were undertaken.
In different ways, the episodes mentioned in this paper shed light upon the relationship between knowledge and the law. In the money laundering case, each of the lawyers offered different views even when they worked in the same Chambers. We were, however, totally unprepared for the extensiveness of their advice. We had anticipated some advice on our use of language and qualification of our interpretation of events. But we were amazed by the lengthy and detailed content as well as the cost of the guidance we received, especially when compliance with it in full could offer no guarantee of avoiding defamation proceedings.
Our amazement was further magnified when further pages of legal opinion and advice were received following the paper's submission to a journal. Our credulity was finally stretched to its limits when it emerged that, co-incidentally, both opinions had been sought from the same Chambers, resulting in the lawyer who had provided the second opinion withdrawing from giving further advice on the grounds of a conflict of interest.
The fact that legal advice provided by the same Chambers could differ so dramatically, with the second opinion effectively finding extensive fault with the first, conveyed the impression that the (expensive and time -consuming) process of securing legal approval could have gone on interminably as a succession of advice, possibly as a justification for the fee exacted, would find fault with previous efforts to comply with legal opinion. Throughout our negotiations, we could not help wondering about the economics of legal opinions. If we had the funds, one option would have been to submit the paper to several lawyers and selected the le ast demanding advice. Lacking this funding, we had no control over the choice of legal opinion as these were determined by our employer and the publisher, respectively. Neither, it seemed, were inclined to canvass a series of legal opinions or obtain a second opinion on those they received. As `amateurs', we were in no position to question the advice tendered if our work was to appear in print.
With the benefit of hindsight, the lengths to which the fear of libel proceedings took us, our publishers and our employers seems extreme to the point of absurdity. Of course, the fact that the article that appeared in Accounting, Organizations and Society did not attract any legal actions could be used as evidence of the soundness and value of the advice. But, of course, that is precisely why the threat of legal proceedings is routinely deployed by those who use their resources to defend their privilege and obstruct forms of debate and accountability. As our discussion of the third episode especially suggests, the threat of legal action is shown to be cynical when charges are not pursued.
On the other hand, we subsequently published an extended version of the same paper as a pamphlet in which we restored substantial parts of what we had been advised to excise by the journal publisher. Despite attracting considerable press attention that amplified some of the more contentious elements of our paper, no legal proceedings were started. One conclusion to be drawn from this is that libel laws are very good business fo r lawyers, not least because there is so much ambiguity surrounding what counts as defamatory, including the defence that a particular statement is a fair comment on a matter of public interest.
Lawyers have a vested interest in interpreting the libel laws as broadly as possible, thereby raising the greatest number of difficulties and exacting the largest fees for their services. This observation might be of comparatively minor importance, of interest primarily to lawyers and their clients, if its effect were not to reinforce and amplify the lay person's sense of vulnerability to legal action, and thus the pressure towards self-censorship to minimise potential exposure. Do these reflections mean that we would avoid seeking legal opinion in similar circumstances? No, because the threat of a libel action remains a serious one that can have crippling consequences financially as well as professionally irrespective of the outcome 72 .
In the case of the Political Quarterly article (Mitchell and Sikka, 1999) , the possibility of legal action being taken persuaded the editor and the publisher to secure a legal opinion.
The threat of legal proceedings might have been sufficient for the editor to treat the paper with caution or even to contrive its rejection 73 . In the event, though, the legal opinion sought In the case of ACCA, the officials chose to exert pressure upon Accountancy Age and Austin Mitchell (a member of the UK Parliament) at a time when they were seeking to block moves to reform the Association. We interpret the threat of legal action by the ACCA as an attempt to muzzle expression of opinion that threatened to tarnish the reputation of its leadership. In this case, the bluff was called as no apology or undertaking of any kind was given despite repeated demands that it be provided.
Our examination of these three episodes indicates how the law i s invoked and becomes entwined in the policing of knowledge. Notably, it is invoked, defensively or aggressively, by those in positions of comparative power -such as ourselves (i.e. self-censorship for fear of lawsuits), employers, publishers, public rela tions firms and occupational associationseither to limit risk of legal action or to inhibit the entry of potentially damaging knowledge into the public sphere. Defenders and apologists of the status-quo routinely make statements -such as accountancy bodies are democratic; accountants serve the public interest; offshore states respect human rights -without fear that these claims will be challenged by an equivalent to the laws of libel. Such knowledge is not policed by threats of lawsuits.'Critics', in contrast, are placed in a 'lesser' space where there is pressure to provide concrete evidence of a particular, legally warrantable kind and to engage in self-censorship in order to avoid the risk of legal action.
Each of the episodes has shown how those e ndowed with considerable economic or symbolic resources are in a stronger position to resist pressures to muzzle or silence their criticisms. Accountancy Age, supported by the financial muscle of an international publisher, published stories showing that accountants were involved in money laundering without any threat of lawsuits. The same magazine ran a number of articles critical of the ACCA and robustly refused to give any undertaking to refrain from doing so in the future.
Many UK newspapers wrote critical stories about Jersey and none (to the best of our knowledge) has been sued. In contrast, both the editor and publisher of Accounting,
Organizations and Society and the Political Quarterly were inclined to seek legal advice and required us to act upon it as a condition of publication. One might conclude from our commentary that the law too easily intimidates journal editors and publishers. Certainly, it would seem that editors feel the need to cover themselves against any possible risk of liability. When they receive pages of advice detailing every conceivable line of possible exposure, editors and publishers are understandably reluctant to risk legal action and therefore require authors to deal comprehensively with the legal advice.
It is also appropriate to note that ACCA sought to silence Sikka by pressurising his employers and by generating 'flak' and negative publicity 74 to portary him as a kind of a folk -devil. The leadership's strategy of refusing to give him a 'right of reply' and failure to publish letters from Sikka and other reformers created the feeling that he was an easy target.
The absence of a 'reply' and the attempted muzzling of Accounting Age possibly persuaded the leadership to believe that it could continue to denigrate reformers. Perhaps, the leadership began to believe its own propaganda and this is why at the 1996 EGM, the ACCA Vice-President went beyond the acceptable limits of politics. The subsequent press coverage was hostile, persuading the ACCA to take disciplinary action (findi ng scapegoats?) against its Vice-President 75 . Whether the episode resulted in any reflections upon the leadership's strategy and policies is open to conjecture.
To conclude, our study illustrates how threats of lawsuits (real or imagined) are mobilised to police knowledge. Our examination of the three episodes shows that the present form UK libel laws (it may also be applicable to other countries) currently operate to inhibit public debate of politically and commercially sensitive issues -such as the reputation ascribed to accountancy firms and associations. This occurs as individuals, such as ourselves, become apprehensive about the prospect of well resourced institutions invoking such laws to suppress discussion within the public sphere of information that they would prefer to remain hidden or unpublished -such as the judgement made in the AGIP case or the report arising from it prepared by the ICAEW. Our study suggests that academics' employers and publishers are also anxious about the prospect of legal action as the advice we consistently received was to comply with legal opinion in full. No more than us, were they inclined to take the risk of not suppressing or amending anything and everything that legal opinion deemed to endanger legal action. Accountancy Age and the MP Austin Mitchell, on the other hand, were willing to stand the heat of legal intervention by refusing to bow to demands that the allegations made by Mitchell (1996) in his Accountancy Age article be retracted. It may be speculated that Accountancy Age did not fear the prospect of being taken to court, and possibly welcomed the publicity associated with a vigorous defence of its high-profile contributor. It is also relevant to note that little, if any, of its income is derived from advertising placed by major firms or professional bodies. So, the financial penalties arising from withdrawal of advertising were minimal. Mitchell may have anticipated that any actions taken against him by the ACCA would be viewed as personally vindictive, given the history of their relationship 76 . Threatening, let alone pressuring, an MP with a law suit is perhaps not the most astute or well calculated of gagging moves. In any event, such actions would probably prove counter-productive for the ACCA's relations with the media and Parliament, not least because Mitchell, himself an ex-academic, is also an established and accomplished protagonist in both of these spheres.
Accountancy Age and Mitchell could generate or count upon adverse publicity surrounding any le gal action taken against them. The same cannot be said for individual academics, their employers or their publishers. As things stand, they are comparatively vulnerable and defenceless against threats of legal action. Although our employers and the publishers were supportive and were enthusiastic about the wider dissemination of our research findings, they shared our sense of vulnerability and urged the seeking of, and compliance with, legal opinions. In a world where financial security counts for a great deal, one could hardly blame them for being cautious or for inclining to require compliance with legal opinions to the letter when they were received.
Our discussion of the episodes has raised questions about how `academic freedom' is and their publishers are currently apprehensive about legal action and inclined to require compliance with legal advice to the letter, there would seem to be a strong case for developing forms of co-operation between Universities and/or publishers to establish and tender for a specialised type of legal opinion 77 . Instead of relying upon chambers that have a commercial interest in identifying every conceivable area where allegations of defamation might be targeted, a more specialised opinion would be guided specifically by a concern to privilege and defend academic freedom in the context of a defence that presents research findings as fair comment on matters of significant public interest. Financial resources for this endeavour might be found by persuading universities individually or the national bodies responsible for research funding in addition to publishers who make profits from scholarly journal publications to contribute to a foundation concerned solely with the advancement of freedom of thought, expression and analysis.
profit making organization. Its trustees include the present authors. 19 In contrast to the AOS paper which makes scant reference to the role of legal opinion in shaping our article, "The Accountants' Laundromat" has a sub -text of self-censure running through it, and readers could (hopefully) sense that the authors were somewhat constrained in telling a fuller story. Were we to acquire the literary skills of a novelist, one possibility would be to explore expurgated aspects of this affair in a fictionalised form.
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This is shown as endnote 3 in Mitchell et al, 1998b. 21 Pages 23-25 in Mitchell et al, 1998b. 22 Page 29 of Mitchell et al, 1998b. 23 The address is http://visar.csustan.edu/aaba/aaba.htm 24 Jersey does not have a publicly available written record of Parliamentary debates. However, the interested parties can purchase audit-cassettes of the debates, costing as much as £10 for a thirty minutes debate.
25
Jersey does not have a formal political Party system. Individuals stand as independent candidates. In reality the relationship between politicians and the world of business is very close. 26 Deputy Gary Matthews. 27 In the interests of clarity, 'key' actors are identified by name.
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A phrase repeated during the Parliamentary proceedings on 19th May 1998 when Jersey sought to pass the insol vency provisions relating to LLPs. 95 pages of legislation was passed in less than 30 minutes. Most of this time was used to attack Prem Sikka who had distributed notes on the shortcomings of the LLP insolvency provisions.
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To date, no major firm has located in Jersey and the UK Parliament is likely to introduce LLP legislation in Spring 1999. 30 The suspension was ordered by the Bailiff who is appointed by the Queen rather than elected by the people. The Bailiff is effectively the President of the Island and also functions as the Speaker of the Jersey States, the head of the civil service and the head of the judiciary. The Bailiff is also a practising judge and hears cases. 31 Had the UK implemented the European Human Rights Convention, some recourse against the respective governments may have been possible. 32 Currently, Syvret is pursuing a case against the Jersey Speaker and the UK government in the European Court for violation of his human rights. His application to have the case heard has been approved. 33 A Home Office press release stated that "Although this is an internal review, we intend to publish a summary of its main findings" (press release dated 20 January 1998). With the absence of any university, Jersey (its population is about 86,000 and financial deposits are about £400 billion) is unlikely to attract much local research interest. 37 Letter (undated) 40 The voting members can delete the President's name and delegate their proxies to another person of their choice, but most rarely nominate someone else. 41 In 1998, the ACCA was persuaded by the Commission for Racial Equality to send an ethnic monitoring questionnaire to all its UK members (Accountancy Age, 3rd December 1998, p. 3).
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Other UK based accountancy bodies (e.g. the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales, the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants) were not exempt from this campaign. However, the campaigns to democratise the UK accountancy bodies are not the main focus of this paper.
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These were numbers 125 and 126 in December 1993 and 1402 in July 1995 Early Day Motions are devices which enable Members of Parliament to 'flag' the issues their consider to be important. These are usually not debated on the floor of the House. 45 The ACCA wrote to all the signatories of the EDMs. 46 Sikka has been a member of the ACCA since 1977.
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Accountancy Age (21 April 1994) reported that "ACCA has given way to pressure from campaigning Labour MP Austin Mitchell and will, for the first time, have its elections to council scrutinised externally" (page 3). 48 In interpreting this event, it ought to be borne in mind that on numerous previous occasions (and since) Sikka had corresponded with the Association on his University's notepaper. On no previous occasion (or since), did any official of the Association sought to raise the contents of letters with the University's Vice-Chancellor. Despite requests, ACCA could not provide any examples of the instances where in response to a letter on a headed notepaper, it has subsequently sought to clarify (or exert pressure) matters with the writer's employers. 49 The threat worried the Head of the Department of Accounting & Finance at Sikka's university (University of East London) who without Sikka's knowledge sought to persuade all his academic colleagues to write a collective letter of apology to ACCA and distance themselves from Sikka's public interventions. Almost all refused. Sikka had the full support of his Vice-Chancellor and Dean who considered the ACCA's pressure as a clumsy attempt to damage human freedoms. 50 A spokesperson for the Association claimed that Sikka "has been influenced by Antonio Gramsci, the founder of the Italian Communist Party in 1921, Gramsci, who believed capitalism would be brought down by undermining western institutions is quoted approvingly in [Sikka's] academic work" (quoted in Gleeson, 1996) . The ACCA's strategy for dealing with Sikka was mentioned in a seven page internal briefing dated 25 th April 1996. 51 For example, the 1996, the AGM was due to be held on 9th May, but on 8th May -a day before the AGM -The Independent (page 21) reported that Sikka was once again not elected.
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A letter of protest was sent to the Association on 11 May 1996. No explanation or apology was received. The ACCA Chief Executive stated " [President] has asked me to write on his behalf to acknowledge your letter to him of 11 May. He has noted the various points which you make".
53
This article could have been published after the election, but was not. 54 In a self-congratulatory statement, the ACCA's Public Relations co-ordinator explained that in 1995 the ACCA influenced no less than 1,400 articles (Public Eye, Oct/Dec 1995,
